Mexico's slow growth paradox by Ibarra, Carlos Alberto





This paper analyzes the problem of slow economic growth in Mexico. 
It decomposes the growth of output from the demand side and reveals 
the critical role played by the sluggish performance of investment. Using 
econometric tools, it argues that this sluggishness can be explained in 
part by the peso’s appreciation during disinflation and its adverse impact 
on investment profitability. Finally, it shows that the problem has been 
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Following the “lost decade” of the 1980s, Mexico’s 
economic prospects brightened as the country began 
receiving large volumes of foreign capital and 
transformed itself into a major exporter of manufactures. 
The positive turn around came after a series of structural 
reforms that liberalized the trade regime and privatized 
most sectors of economic activity. Mexico renegotiated 
its foreign debt, consolidated its public fi nances and, 
with a temporary setback in 1995, decisively and 
successfully reined in infl ation. Yet despite the export 
boom, the substantial infl ows of foreign capital and 
a stabilized economy, Mexico has faced a persistent 
problem of slow growth.
Analysts have offered a number of explanations 
for this seeming paradox. In an influential study, 
Moreno-Brid (1999) argues that the external constraint 
on Mexican growth tightened after trade liberalization 
because of a rise in the elasticity of imports with 
respect to gross domestic product (GDP).1 According 
to Blecker (2007), the constraint has at times been 
reinforced by the volatility of capital fl ows and the 
economic cycle of the United States, as well as by the 
recurrent appreciation of the peso. Other authors point 
to the perverse effects of the country’s prolonged credit 
crunch, refl ecting the inadequate pace of reforms in the 
judicial and banking systems.2
This paper offers a complementary interpretation 
of the slow-growth problem in Mexico. Its point of 
departure is the observation that since the late 1980s 
Mexican macroeconomic management —and monetary 
policy in particular— has focused on reducing infl ation. 
As a result of this prolonged disinflationary mode, 
the peso has appreciated in real terms and returns 
on investment have consequently declined. The 
adverse impact that the peso’s appreciation has had on 
profi tability has been reinforced by a long-term fall in 
the output/capital ratio. As a result, aggregate investment 
has not refl ected the dynamism of exports and has been 
inadequate to sustain high rates of economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows: section 
II describes Mexico’s recent macroeconomic 
performance; section III estimates the contribution 
of exports and investment to GDP growth; section IV 
examines the relationship between profi ts, investment 
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1 See also López and Cruz (2000) and Pacheco-López (2005).
II
Mexico’s recent macroeconomic performance
After the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982, Mexico’s 
economic growth stalled. During 1982-1988 GDP rose 
barely 0.2% a year. Yet the export sector expanded rapidly, 
driven by the weakness of the domestic market and the 
trade liberalization measures implemented in 1986-1987. 
In relation to 1960-1977, the share of total exports in 
GDP more than doubled. Particularly impressive was the 
expansion of manufacturing exports, which rose at an 
average annual rate of 18.2% (Table 1).
At the end of the 1980s a combination of factors 
—including a new stabilization plan, the defi nitive 
renegotiation of the country’s external debt, and 
renewed access for developing countries to the world 
capital market— turned around the outlook for the 
Mexican economy. Foreign investment rose sharply, 
from 2.4% of GDP in 1982-1988 to 6.3% in 1989-1994. 
The export sector continued to perform strongly, with 
an average annual growth of 7.8%. Manufacturing 
2 See Bergoeing et al. (2001) and Tornell, Westermann and 
Martínez (2004).
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exports, in particular, rose at an average rate of 12.1% 
and came to represent 75% of goods exports. Yet 
despite the export boom and surging capital infl ows, 
growth began to slow after peaking at 5% in 1990. 
The average growth rate of GDP in 1989-1994 was a 
modest 3.9%.
As is well known, Mexico suffered a currency 
crisis in December of 1994 and a full-blown fi nancial 
crisis in 1995. There were large outfl ows of capital, 
due mainly to the reversal of previous portfolio 
investments. GDP ended up falling by more than 6% 
in 1995. Economic activity recovered quickly, though, 
TABLE 1
Mexico: basic macroeconomic indicators for selected periods
 1960-1977 1978-1981 1982-1988 1989-1994 1996-2007
Total exports (%)a
 Growth rate 6.69aa 18.76 8.26 7.82 8.60
 Share of GDP 5.31 7.43 12.14 14.86 34.35
Manufacturing exports (%)
 Growth rateb 11.26bb 9.23 18.20 12.14 8.42
 Share of goods exportsc 26.38cc 17.62 45.77 75.16 85.29
Foreign capital infl owsd 1.30 5.12 2.36 6.28dd 3.43
 (Share of GDP, %)
GDP growth rate (%)e 6.23 9.11 0.22 3.91 3.58
CPI infl ation  (%)f
 Annual average rate 13.9ee 22.5 88 16.9 10.8
 Minimum rate 4.9 (1972) 17.5 (1978) 57.8 (1985) 6.9 (1994) 3.6 (2006)
 Maximum rate 29.1 (1977) 27.9 (1981) 131.8 (1987) 26.7 (1990) 34.4 (1996)
 Average annual change, in percentage points 3.4ff -0.3 12.3 -17.9 -2.6
Relative labour cost (1990 = 100)g
 Average … … … 116.8 115.4
 Minimum … … … 92.2 (1989) 75.4 (1996)
 Maximum … … … 138.8 (1993) 135.7 (2007)
 Average annual change (%) … … ... 8.0 4.8
CPI-based multilateral real exchange rate (1990 = 100)h
 Average 68.7gg 76.1 100.3 87.8 76.3
 Minimum 63.5 (1975) 62.0 (1981) 78.3 (1985) 100.6 (1989) 102.9 (1996)
 Maximum 87.7 (1977) 87.1 (1978) 134.4 (1987) 73.4 (1993) 61.17 (2002)
 Average annual change 4.0hh -8.1 11.2 -6.0 -3.2
a Average annual rates from national accounts data at constant local prices. Source: World Bank (2005) and INEGI.
b Average annual rates from balance of payments data defl ated by the United States producer price index. Source: World Bank (2005) and 
Bank of  Mexico (for the period 1982-2007).
c Average annual rates from balance of payments data in current dollars. Source: World Bank (2005) and Bank of  Mexico (for the period 
1982-2007).
d Bank loans, foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment. Annual average of quarterly fl ows in United States dollars. GDP was 
converted to dollars using the nominal exchange rate. Source: World Bank (2005), INEGI and Bank of Mexico.
e Average annual rates. Source: INEGI.
f Source: Bank of Mexico.
g Mexico/United States ratio of the unit labour cost in the manufacturing sector. Source: INEGI.
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and in 1996 GDP rose by more than 5%. Capital infl ows 
returned, and averaged 3.4% of GDP annually between 
1996 and 2007.3
Manufacturing exports continued to expand, 
although at a slower pace than in the early 1990s. Over 
1996-2007, manufactures represented 85% of goods 
exports, and by 1998 Mexico was the world’s fourth-
largest exporter of manufactures (Lall 2000). Exports 
not only grew, but they improved in quality as well. 
The composition of the export basket came to look 
like that of countries with per capita incomes higher 
than Mexico’s (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007, 
Figure 4). The country’s exports now consist for the 
most part of medium- or high-tech goods (Lall 2000), 
and they have diversifi ed since the entry into force of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
(Feenstra and Kee 2007).
Despite the recovery of foreign investment and 
the quantitative and qualitative development of exports, 
average annual GDP growth in 1996-2007 was only 
3.6%. The problem was not that Mexico was unable 
to achieve relatively high GDP growth rates —indeed, 
it did so in 1990, 1997 and 2000— but rather that 
those rates did not last long. There are factors at play 
that reduce the growth rate and tend to keep it low. 
This paper argues that one of those factors is the 
behaviour of the real exchange rate, through its impact 
on profi tability and investment.
While the economy failed to sustain high rates 
of GDP growth, macroeconomic management —and 
monetary policy in particular— focused on reducing 
infl ation (Ramos and Torres 2005; Galindo and Ros, 
2008; Ibarra, 2008a). This came after the economy 
faced a serious infl ation problem throughout most of 
the 1980s, with infl ation climbing by 12.3 percentage 
points per year, and soaring to 131.8% in 1987. Average 
annual infl ation over the period 1982-1988 was 88%.
Disinfl ation began in 1988. At fi rst it was swift, 
with the annual infl ation rate falling from around 180% 
at the beginning of 1988 to less than 20% a year later. 
Thereafter the process slowed: the average annual 
inflation rate between 1989 and 1994 was 16.9%, 
dropping to 6.9% in 1994.
The disinfl ationary scheme collapsed in December 
1994, when Mexico was forced to abandon an 
explicit exchange rate band and let the peso fl oat. The 
subsequent depreciation of the currency caused a surge 
in infl ation. Yet this phenomenon was short-lived, and 
the economy entered into a new stage of disinfl ation. 
Inflation peaked at 34.4% in 1996 and reached a 
minimum of 3.6% in 2006; on average, it fell by 2.6 
percentage points a year.
In short, Mexico’s macroeconomic management 
has been in “disinfl ationary mode” since the late 1980s. 
This has had a sharp impact on the exchange rate. 
Given the restrictive bias of monetary policy, the rate of 
currency depreciation has not kept pace with the infl ation 
differential between Mexico and the United States. As 
can be seen from the effective real index calculated by 
the Bank of Mexico (Table 1, fi nal lines), the result is 
that the peso has tended to appreciate in real terms.
The peso’s appreciation contributed to the success 
of disinfl ation (Ibarra 2003) but it impacted adversely 
on the profi tability of the tradables sector. The evolution 
of the unit labour cost in manufactures (in dollars and 
relative to the United States) illustrates the impact. In 
1988, after an important round of trade liberalization, 
the labour cost index stood at 82.9 (1990 = 100). In 
the first disinflationary period (1989-1994) it rose 
steadily at a rate of 8% a year, peaking at 138.8% in 
1993. The sharp nominal currency depreciation of 1995 
reduced it to the level observed in the mid-1980s (1996 
= 75.4), but with renewed disinfl ation the relative cost 
of labour started rising again, and reached a level of 
135.7 in 2007 (Table 1).
3 Although this fi gure is about half the level of capital fl ows Mexico 
recorded in the early 1990s, it is high from a historical perspective: 
for example, in the high-growth era from 1960 to 1977, capital 
infl ows amounted to 1.3% of GDP.
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What is the cause of the Mexican economy’s meagre 
growth? There is broad recognition in the literature 
on economic growth that the issue can be usefully 
addressed at different levels. A distinction is usually 
made between the proximate and the underlying 
determinants of GDP growth. Decomposition exercises 
are an example of the fi rst approach. The following 
paragraphs examine the evolution of GDP in light 
of the contribution of the different components of 
aggregate demand.4
The decomposition of GDP is useful for analyzing 
Mexico’s growth experience because it highlights 
elements such as the sustained expansion of exports 
since the late 1980s, the upward trend in the import 
rate after trade liberalization, and the boom in consumer 
spending at the beginning of the 1990s. We can guess 
that these factors are important from a medium-term 
perspective. There is the question, for example, of 
determining the net effect of exports on aggregate 
growth, in a strictly accounting sense, bearing in mind 
the virtually simultaneous rise in the import rate. As 
exports rose, imports displaced local production.
The point of departure is the simple identity 
between GDP Y and aggregate demand, where the latter 
is the sum of private and government consumption (C + 
G), investment I and net exports (X - M). The identity 
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where d0, the Keynesian demand multiplier, is by 
defi nition equal to the reciprocal of the domestic saving 
rate [s=(Y-C-G)/Y] plus the import rate (m=M/Y).
Growth in GDP must be backed by an expansion 
in investment and exports, although sustained changes 
in the multiplier can also have an infl uence. Figure 1 
shows that, after a period of relative stability starting 
in at least the 1960s, the demand multiplier began a 
steep descent in 1987, falling from 3.6 in 1986 to 1.6 
in 2007.
By defi nition, variations in the multiplier refl ect 
the combined infl uence of the saving rate and the import 
rate. The saving rate has fl uctuated around a level of 
0.20. The sustained fall in the demand multiplier is 
explained by the behaviour of the import rate, which 
rose from 0.084 in 1986 to 0.46 in 2007. Following 
major rounds of trade liberalization in 1986-1987 and 
in 1994, there were sharp increases in the import rate. 
Figure 2 shows that all components of the rate shared 
this tendency.5
Apart from trade liberalization, changes in the real 
exchange rate are bound to have an infl uence on the 
import rate. Figure 3 presents the joint evolution of the 
import rate and the real exchange rate index based on 
the consumer price index (CPI). For the sake of visual 
effectiveness, the fi gure shows the reciprocal index, 
so that an increase indicates a real appreciation of the 
currency. There is a positive and substantial association 
III
Exports, investment and GDP growth in Mexico
4 See Berg and Taylor (2000) for a similar methodology, and Ros 
and Lustig (2000) for its application to Mexico.
5 See the appendix for a defi nition of these components.
FIGURE 1
Mexico: demand multiplier and its 
components, 1960-2007
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of national accounts data 
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Saving rate, right axis
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between the two series, with a correlation coeffi cient 
of 0.5024. The correlation of the real exchange rate 
with specific import rates ranges from 0.4318 for 
intermediate goods to 0.6222 for capital goods (in 
the latter case, starting in 1978 —leaving aside the 
downward trend in the import rate associated with 
import substitution policies).
The link between the real exchange rate and the 
import rate would have to be subjected to a rigorous 
test. But the above evidence suggests that the tendency 
of the currency to appreciate in real terms may have 
accentuated the impact of trade liberalization, and may 
well have produced an “excessive” jump in the import 
rate (Moreno-Brid, Santamaría and Rivas 2005a and 
2005b).
Figure 4 shows the contributions, adjusted by the 
multiplier, of investment and exports to GDP since 
1960. GDP growth in the initial portion of the sample 
was supported by rising investment. Using equation (1), 
it can be calculated that around 80% of the cumulative 
GDP growth between 1960 and 1977 can be attributed 
to investment.
The contribution of the various components of 
aggregate demand reversed after trade liberalization, 
with exports becoming the main source of GDP growth. 
Between 1988 and 2007, GDP rose by 829.1 billion 
1993 pesos: 93% of this growth corresponded to exports 
and only 7% to investment (again, after adjusting both 
variables for changes in the multiplier). At fi rst glance, 
it would seem that Mexico’s failure to achieve strong 
economic growth since the 1980s can be attributed to 
the sluggish behaviour of investment.6 7
FIGURE 2
Mexico: import rates, 1960-2007
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of external trade data from Bank of Mexico and national accounts data from the World Bank 
(2005) and INEGI.
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6 To cast this in greater detail: the average growth rate of real 
investment in this period was 5%, which was mostly cancelled 
out by a cumulative decline of 50% in the demand multiplier. The 
average growth rate of investment adjusted by the multiplier was 
1%; the corresponding fi gure for exports was 5.6%. Conclusions 
as to the impact of the components of aggregate demand on GDP 
growth depend on the length of the period considered. Following 
the fi rst round of trade liberalization, GDP growth was determined 
by investment, with exports making only a minimal contribution 
(Ros, Draisma et al. 1996; Ros and Lustig 2000). The situation was 
reversed after the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
came into effect.
7 In a similar conclusion, Blyde and Fernández-Arias (2004) calculate 
that the capital-labour ratio in Mexico in the 1990s was more than 
20% lower than what would be expected for a country at Mexico’s 
level of development; in Latin America, only Guatemala was in a 
worse position.
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From the standpoint of aggregate demand, the 
relative pace of growth in investment and exports is 
irrelevant: what matters is the overall pace. But from the 
supply side the distinction is important. In contrast to 
exports, investment creates installed capacity directly. 
Thus, a weak investment performance also limits GDP 
growth indirectly, by creating bottlenecks that can slow 
export growth and raise the import rate even further.
The foregoing decomposition is based on 
equation (1), which does not distinguish between 
FIGURE 3
Mexico: real exchange rate and import rate, 1960-2005
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics) and Bank of 
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FIGURE 4
Mexico: decomposition of gross domestic product, 1960-2007
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private and public expenditure. In a more detailed 
analysis, government expenditure can be separated 
out, and the infl uence of variations in the tax rate 
can be taken into account. Starting once again with 








),( 11  (2)
where IP and IG represent private and government 
investment. The demand multiplier now depends on 
the private saving rate [sP=(Y-T-C)/Y, where T is taxes], 
the tax rate (t=T/Y) and the import rate.
Figure 5 illustrates the behaviour of the redefi ned 
demand multiplier and its components since 1980. Here 
again, the multiplier shows a downward trend from 
the second half of the 1980s, attributable to a rising 
import rate. The private saving rate and the tax rate 
show a marked cyclical behaviour.8 The private saving 
rate displays slightly greater fl uctuations than the total 
saving rate presented earlier in fi gure 1; this refl ects the 
fact that the evolution of the tax rate tends to mirror 
the private saving rate (when the latter is calculated 
without the tax rate).
Figure 6 shows the contribution to GDP of the 
different components of aggregate demand since 
1980. The fi gure reveals something new: in Mexico, 
the weakness of private investment, which has tended 
to depress GDP growth, has been compounded by the 
stagnation of public investment.
Several authors have suggested the possibility 
that the external sector, through a rise in the import 
rate, has constrained Mexico’s growth. But Mexico 
has received signifi cant infl ows of foreign capital since 
the early 1990s, which would tend to alleviate this 
possible constraint. Thus, the behaviour of investment 
demand is revealing when looked at from the balance 
of payments perspective.
According to the balance of payments identity, in 
any given period, the fl ow of foreign capital to a country 
must be equal to the sum of domestic capital outfl ows, 
the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the 
central bank, and the current account defi cit:
Foreign capital infl ows = domestic capital outfl ows 
+ reserves accumulation + current account defi cit,
 (3)
while the current account defi cit must be equal to the 
difference between domestic saving and investment.
8 The tax rate includes all public sector revenues classifi ed as taxes 
(basically, income tax and value added tax) derived from non-oil 
economic activities, plus gasoline taxes.
FIGURE 5
Mexico: demand multiplier and its components, 1980-2007
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from Bank of Mexico (public fi nances) and the World Bank (2005) and INEGI (national 
accounts).
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Figure 7 offers information on selected periods 
(fi rst quarter 1983 to fourth quarter 1989, fi rst quarter 
1990 to third quarter 1994, and fi rst quarter of 1996 
to fourth quarter 2007). The initial external situation is 
well known. Foreign capital infl ows were relatively low 
(averaging 1.7% of GDP), and the economy was forced 
to transfer resources abroad through a current account 
surplus (0.7% of GDP). From a balance of payments 
perspective, these resources were used up partly in a 
modest accumulation of reserves (averaging 0.6% of 
GDP) and mostly to sustain an outfl ow of capital (1.8% 
of GDP). During this period the (fi xed) investment rate 
was 18.5% of GDP.
The macroeconomic context turned around 
completely in the following years. A combination of 
local and external factors sparked a great infl ow of 
foreign capital, averaging 7.3% of GDP. There was an 
important shift in the current account balance, which 
recorded a defi cit of 5.3% of GDP. Despite the heavy 
capital infl ow, the average investment rate over the 
period 1990-1994 was only 19.2% of GDP, i.e. less 
than one point above the rate for the previous period. 
The sharp change in the current account balance had 
as its main counterpart a reduction in the domestic 
saving rate.
In 1996-2007, foreign capital infl ows declined on 
average to 3.4% of GDP, but they remained well above 
the fl ows observed in the 1980s. Nearly a quarter of the 
capital infl ow was accumulated as reserves. The current 
account defi cit averaged only 1.8% of GDP, well below 
the 5.3% recorded in the early 1990s. As the counterpart 
to the lower current account defi cit, there was a recovery 
in the domestic saving rate, while the investment rate 
rose slightly, from 19.2% to 19.9% of GDP.9
In short, during the period 1996-2007 the average 
investment rate exceeded that of the “lost years” 
of 1983-1989 by less than 1.5% of GDP, a modest 
adjustment that took place in the midst of substantial 
infl ows of foreign capital.
FIGURE 6
Mexico: GDP decomposition, 1980-2007
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IP share of private investment in GDP growth
9 The large accumulation of reserves during this period suggests that, 
although the higher import rate could have potentially tightened the 
external constraint on growth, the constraint did not apply.
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The weak growth of the Mexican economy can be 
attributed, under one approach, to the low dynamism 
of investment in a context defi ned by disinfl ation and 
the tendency of the peso to appreciate in real terms. 
This section examines formally the effect of the real 
exchange rate on the profi tability of the manufacturing 
sector and, by that channel, on investment.10
To conduct the empirical analysis, let us assume 
that the prices set by fi rms operating under imperfect 
competition depend on a (possibly varying) profi t margin 
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where P is the domestic price index in local currency, 
u is the profi t margin, a is labour employed per unit 
of output, W is the nominal wage, and Ω is the unit 
labour cost. The equation is divided by the nominal 
exchange rate S (defi ned in terms of pesos per dollar) 
to convert the domestic price and the unit labour cost 
into dollars.
We can write an equation similar to (4) for the 
external economy, indicating the external variables with 
an asterisk. Dividing the domestic price equation by its 



















Equation (5) indicates that a relative increase in 
the country’s unit labour cost must be matched by 
FIGURE 7
Mexico: balance of payments and investment rate, selected periods
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from Bank of Mexico, the World Bank (2005) and INEGI (GDP in current pesos, 
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IV
Investment and the profi t rate
10 Using data for the period from the fi rst quarter of 1981 to the 
second quarter of 2000, Lederman, Menéndez et al. (2003) show 
that a higher volatility in the real exchange rate tends to depress 
the investment rate in Mexico. There has been much debate over 
the impact of the real exchange rate on the level and growth rate 
of GDP. Some authors have found mostly contractionary effects; 
see Kamin and Rogers (2000) and the references in that paper; for 
the opposite view, see Galindo and Ros (2008), Ibarra (2008b), and 
Blecker (2007).
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either an increase in its relative prices or a reduction in 
its relative profi t margin, where a lower profi t margin 
would produce a fall in the share of profi ts in GDP (z) 








Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of Mexico’s 
relative labour cost and relative consumer prices 
(summarized earlier in table 1). It will be recalled 
that the first series corresponds to the ratio of the 
unit labour cost in manufactures, in dollars, between 
Mexico and the United States, while the second series 
corresponds to the CPI-based multilateral real exchange 
rate index of the Bank of Mexico; for the sake of visual 
effectiveness, the latter index has been inverted so that 
an increase indicates a real appreciation.
There is a solid association between the two series, 
as equation (5) suggests, with a correlation coeffi cient 
of 0.8311 during the period 1985-2007. Changes in 
relative costs and relative prices are closely connected. 
A misaligned exchange rate —i.e. one that does not 
isolate relative costs from changes in relative nominal 
wages and productivities— could cause a slowing of 
exports and a loss of market share.
We can examine this effect by regressing the 
growth of exports on the real exchange rate, and 
controlling for market growth.11 Table 2 presents the 
results of the unit root test on the variables used in 
the econometric analysis. The unit root hypothesis is 
rejected for nearly all variables, in particular by the 
Phillips-Perron test.
Some variables have borderline p-values in the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The share of profits 
in value added from manufacturing is probably not 
stationary, or it may be stationary around a linear trend. 
Because of this ambiguity, the regressions include the 
results of unit root tests applied to the residuals of the 
long-term version of the estimated equations. As is 
well known, the possibility of a spurious regression 
can be discarded when the unit root hypothesis for the 
residuals is rejected.
The regressions were estimated with quarterly 
series corresponding to the period 1988-2007, i.e. the 
period subsequent to Mexico’s trade liberalization. In 
all cases the point of departure was an autoregressive 
distributed lag model, typically with four lags in the 
11 See the appendix for the source and precise defi nition of the 
variables included in the regressions of this section.
FIGURE 8
Mexico: real exchange rate and relative labour cost, 1980-2007
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dependent variable and the regressors, although some 
models had to begin with fi ve lags in the dependent 
variable to correct a problem of autocorrelation 
in the residuals. The initial lag structure was then 
simplifi ed according to the statistical signifi cance of 
each coeffi cient.
To make sure that the simplifi cation yielding the 
fi nal model is acceptable in statistical terms, all the 
regressions include a Wald test for the hypothesis that 
the eliminated variables have coeffi cients that are jointly 
equal to zero. They also include the Jarque-Bera test 
for the normal distribution of residuals, the Breusch-
Godfrey test for the absence of up to fourth-order 
autocorrelation, the Engle test for the absence of ARCH 
(autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic) errors, and 
Ramsey’s RESET test for general specifi cation.
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the 
growth rate of manufacturing exports (GEXP) on the 
logarithm of the CPI-based real exchange rate index 
(LNRER), the growth rate of the United States Industrial 
Production Index (GUS) and two dummy variables to 
capture a temporary increment —with the formation of 
NAFTA— in export growth during 1994 and 1995 (or a 
permanent increase in the level of exports since 1994, 
which is equivalent) produces the following results:12
12 Although not statistically signifi cant, the fi fth lag of GEXP was 
retained to eliminate a problem of autocorrelation in the residuals.
TABLE 2
Mexico: unit root testsa
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Phillips-Perron test
 Level Level  First  Level Level  First 
  with trend  difference  with trend difference
Growth rate of manufacturing 
 exports, GEXP1/ -2.6625* -2.8631 -7.0365*** -2.6625* -2.9800 -8.6171***
Log. of the real exchange rate, 
 LNRER2/ -2.5702b -2.4334 -8.1501*** -2.6780* -2.7913 -8.2061***
Growth rate of industrial production 
 in the United States, GUS1/ -2.5470b -2.5107 -4.1686*** -2.7817* -2.7473 -5.2266***
Share of profi ts in manufacturing 
 value added, PROFIT2/ -1.1703 -3.4572*c5/ -9.6741*** -1.4044 -2.3108 -9.6889***
Growth rate of manufacturing 
 production, GMPI2/ -2.08604/ -2.29384/ -9.5087***4/ -4.0503*** -3.9804** -10.0838***
Investment growth rate, GINV3/ -2.5554b5/ -2.54165/ -8.2855***5/ -3.2852** -3.2640* -6.7001***
GDP growth rate, GGDP3/ -3.6762***6/ -3.6506**6/ -8.4493***5/ -3.3764** -3.3522* -7.9005***
Nominal interest rate, NIR3/ -4.9442*** -5.3446*** -8.9183*** -5.1204*** -5.4016*** -9.4123***
Infl ation rate, INF3/ -5.7769*** -5.9448*** -4.4028*** -4.5717*** -4.0284** -4.6306***
Private saving rate, SAVING3/ -1.6223 -1.6902 -4.1920*** -2.9508** -2.9967 -21.2476***
Source: author’s estimations. See the appendix for defi nition and source of each variable.
***, **, *: Unit root hypothesis rejected at 1%, 5% and 10% signifi cance levels.
a Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with intercept and lag length determined by the Schwarz information criterion. Phillips-Perron test with 
intercept, Bartlett kernel, and Newey-West bandwidth. MacKinnon critical values.
b p-value is between 0.1 and 0.11.
c p-value is 0.0513.
 Note: the sample used in each test is the same as that used in the corresponding regressions, although in some cases its size is smaller 
because of the inclusion of lags in the test:
1/ 1988-Q1 2007-Q2, 78 observations.
2/ 1988-Q1 2007-Q4, 80 observations.
3/ 1988-Q1 2007-Q3, 79 observations.
4/ Reduction of the sample to 1988-Q2 2007-Q4, 79 observations.
5/ Reduction of the sample to 1988-Q2 2007-Q3, 78 observations.
6/ Reduction of the sample to 1988-Q3 2007-Q3, 77 observations.
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The estimation results confi rm the strong infl uence 
of the United States economy on the performance 
of Mexico’s manufacturing exports. Changes in the 
growth rate of the United States IPI induce more than 
proportional changes in the export growth rate. The 
real exchange rate also has a signifi cant infl uence. For 
example, the logarithm of the real exchange rate index 
moved from 4.6329 in 1996 to 4.1108 in 2002, while 
the export growth rate moved over the same time from 
0.179 to 0.019, i.e. it fell by 16 percentage points. The 
 GEXP = (7a)
– 0.7074 + 0.2949 GEXP(-1) – 0.3632 GEXP(-4) + 0.0804 GEXP(-5) – 0.1720 LNRER(-1)
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00)
+ 0.3435 LNRER(-4) + 1.0805 GUS + 0.3729 GUS(-4) + 0.0849 NAFTA94 + 0.2235 NAFTA95
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
The p-values are indicated in parentheses beneath the estimated coeffi cients.
Sample: fi rst quarter of 1988 to second quarter of 2007 (n=78).
Adjusted R2 = 0.8568.
Jarque-Bera statistic (probability): 0.4826 (0.7856).
F-statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey fourth-order test (probability): 1.7598 (0.1479)
F-statistic from the Engle ARCH effect test (probability): 2.4103 (0.1248).
F-statistic from the Ramsey RESET test (probability): 1.9998 (0.1619).
F-statistic from the Wald test (probability): 0.9103 (0.5143).
Unit root tests on long-run residuals (with intercept; see the specifi cations in Table 2). 
t-statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (probability): -3.6182 (0.0076).
Adjusted t-statistic from the Phillips-Perron test (probability): -4.4999 (0.0005).
where the long-run solution is:
 GEXP = -0.7161 + 0.1736 LNRER + 1.4711 GUS + 0.0859 NAFTA94 + 0.2263 NAFTA95 (7b)
FIGURE 9
Mexico: real exchange rate and share of profi ts in manufacturing value added,
fi rst quarter of 1988 to third quarter of 2007
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from INEGI (Monthly Industrial Survey) and Bank of Mexico (real exchange rate).
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estimated coeffi cient on the real exchange rate allows 
us to attribute nine points of this decrease to currency 
appreciation.
Equations (5) and (6) imply that a currency 
appreciation can have an adverse effect on profit 
margins and thus on the share of profits in GDP. 
Figure 9 shows the close link between that share in 
Mexican manufactures (calculated as unity minus the 
share of wages and salaries in value added) and the 
real exchange rate. At the beginning of the 1990s, and 
again in the wake of the 1995 fi nancial crisis, the profi t 
share fell as the currency appreciated.
It is possible, however, that the changes in the 
profit share reflect the economic cycle rather than 
variations in the real exchange rate. To examine this 
possibility, an OLS regression of the profi t share in 
manufactures (PROFIT) on the growth rate of the 
manufacturing production index of Mexico (GMPI) 
and the logarithm of the real exchange rate index was 
estimated, with the following results:13
13 Although not shown, the regressions include a linear trend, given 
the possible trend-stationarity of the profi t share (see table 2), and 
quarterly dummy variables.
14 The positive sign of the real exchange rate coeffi cient supports a 
causality interpretation that runs from the real exchange rate to the 
profi t share. Assume causality ran the other way. If fi rms exogenously 
raised their prices (and thus their profi t margin and the profi t share), 
 PROFIT = (8a)
- 0.1187 + 0.8211 PROFIT(-1) + 0.2863 PROFIT(-4) – 0.2278 PROFIT(-5) + 0.1430 LNRER
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0 1) (0.00)
- 0.0992 LNRER(-1) + 0.0893 GMPI – 0.1213 GMPI(-1)
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
The p-values are indicated in parentheses beneath the estimated coeffi cients.
Sample: second quarter of 1988 to fourth quarter of 2007 (n=79).
Adjusted R2 = 0.9611.
Jarque-Bera statistic (probability): 1.43 15 (0.4888).
F-statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey fourth-order test (probability): 0.3717 (0.8280).
F-statistic from the Engle ARCH effect test (probability): 0.0679 (0.7952).
F-statistic from the Ramsey RESET test (probability): 2.0 103 (0.1609).
F-statistic from the Wald test (probability): 1.0365 (0.4195).
Unit root tests on long-run residuals (with intercept; see the specifi cations in Table 2):
t-statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (probability): -3.3941 (0.0142).
Adjusted t-statistic from the Phillips-Perron test (probability): -4.2871 (0.0009).
where the long-run solution is:
 PROFIT = -0.9858 + 0.3637 LNRER – 0.2652 GMPI (8b)
Equation (8) shows that a decline of the profi t 
share in manufacturing value added is associated with 
an appreciation in the currency.14 The estimated effect 
is substantial. For example, according to the long-run 
version of the equation, the currency appreciation of 
1988- 1993 tended to produce a drop of 15 percentage 
points in the profi t share, while the actual decline was 
9.5 points.
To get a quantitative idea of the effect of the 
profi t share on investment, an OLS regression of the 
growth rate of fi xed investment (GINV) on the profi t 
share in manufactures, the GDP growth rate (GGDP), the 
nominal interest rate (NIR) and the infl ation rate (INF) 
was estimated, with the following results:15
then the currency would appreciate. The real exchange rate and the 
profi t share would be negatively correlated.
15 Separating the nominal interest rate and the infl ation rate produced 
better results than using their difference as a measure of the real 
interest rate. The regression also included a linear trend (see footnote 
13) and, in order to achieve normality of the residuals, a dummy 
variable for the third quarter of 1989.
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The coeffi cients estimated have the expected signs, 
with an implicit negative effect of the real interest rate 
on investment growth and a positive effect from the 
GDP growth rate. The profi t share has a lagged positive 
effect on investment growth. The size of the effect is 
signifi cant. For example, the 6.5 point fall in the profi t 
share during the period 1996-2002 tended to reduce the 
investment growth rate by six points, or about one-third 
of the reduction actually observed.16
Thus far, a currency appreciation tends to reduce 
GDP growth, not only by its oft-noted effect on export 
growth but also by its effect on the profi t share and 
investment growth. There is a possible offsetting 
effect. If the workers’ saving rate is less than that of 
investors, a currency appreciation will tend to reduce 
the overall saving rate by increasing the share of labour 
in income.
A glance at fi gures 5 and 8 suggests that there is 
indeed a close connection between the real exchange 
rate and the private saving rate in Mexico. But the saving 
rate could also react to changes in the GDP growth 
rate. To separate these effects, an OLS regression of the 
private saving rate (SAVING)17 on the real exchange rate 
and the GDP growth rate was estimated, yielding:
 GINV = (9a)
- 0.3143 + 0.4806 GINV(-1) + 0.1118 GINV(-2) – 0.1975 GINV(-3) – 0.6304 PROFIT + 0.8390 PROFIT(-1) 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
+ 0.3483 PROFIT(-4) + 2.5105 GGDP – 1.26 GGDP – 0.0021 NIR + 0.0041 INF – 0.0048 INF(-1) + 0.0016 INF(-2)
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The p-values are indicated in parentheses beneath the estimated coeffi cients.
Sample: fi rst quarter of 1988 to third quarter of 2007 (n=79).
Adjusted R2 = 0.9606.
Jarque-Bera statistic (probability): 0.3587 (0.8358).
F-statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey fourth-order test (probability): 0.1612 (0.9571).
F-statistic from the Engle ARCH effect test (probability): 2.0129 (0.1601).
F-statistic from the Ramsey RESET test (probability): 0.0090 (0.9247).
F-statistic from the Wald test (probability): 0.4312 (0.9435).
Unit root tests on long-run residuals (with intercept; see the specifi cations in Table 2):
t-statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (probability): -6.3882 (0.0000).
Adjusted t-statistic from the Phillips-Perron test (probability): -5.0706 (0.0001).
where the long-run solution is:
 GINV = -0.5194 + 0.9204 PROFIT + 2.0669 GGDP – 0.0034 NIR + 0.0016 INF (9b)
16 In principle, the causality between profi tability and investment can 
run both ways. As Kalecki noted long ago (1942), a rise in investment 
can raise profi ts by its effect on aggregate demand. Equation (9) 
captures a different, lagged effect of profi ts on investment.
17 This rate is similar to that used in equation (2), after eliminating 
the seasonal effects through a regression on a set of quarterly 
dummy variables.
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The private saving rate appears to behave in (lagged) 
countercyclical fashion, a somewhat anomalous result in 
light of permanent-income theories of consumption, but 
which could be explained by the existence of consumer 
credit constraints. As expected, the real exchange rate 
has a marked effect on the saving rate. For example, 
according to the long-run real exchange rate coeffi cient, 
the 52% appreciation between 1996 and 2002 tended to 
reduce the saving rate by around 7.5 percentage points, 
a fi gure that is one percentage point higher than the 
reduction actually observed.18
The results show that a currency appreciation has 
partial effects on aggregate demand that act in opposite 
directions: on the one hand, it depresses aggregate 
demand by its negative effect on the trade balance 
and the profi tability of investment, while on the other 
hand, it increases demand by a fall in the saving rate. 
In principle, the net outcome is uncertain.19
In the specifi c case of Mexico, and particularly 
since NAFTA came into effect, the currency appreciation-
induced decline in the saving rate has been more 
than offset by the increased share of imports in GDP 
(due presumably to that same appreciation and to the 
liberalization of the trade regime). As a result, the 
demand multiplier dropped. This, together with the 
sluggish pace of investment, produced a fl at path for 
the investment levels adjusted by the multiplier and 
the contribution of this variable to GDP growth was 
almost nil.
Our analysis has focused on the profit share. 
Yet the behaviour of the profi t rate (profi ts/capital) r 
depends not only on the profi t share (profi ts/GDP) but 
also on the GDP/capital ratio k, by the defi nition:
 r = zk (11)
It is difficult to measure the GDP/capital ratio 
because a long series for the capital stock is unavailable. 
However, an estimate can be obtained from the 
following equation:
 g = ikm (12)
 SAVING = (10a)
- 0.0518 + 0.5607 SAVING(-1) + 0.6525 SAVING(-4) - 0.3387 SAVING(-5) + 0.0182 LNRER 
 (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
- 0.1628 GGDP(-2) + 0.2077 GGDP(-3) – 0.1708 GGDP(-4)
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01)
The p-values are indicated in parentheses beneath the estimated coeffi cients.
Sample: fi rst quarter of 1988 to third quarter of 2007 (n=79).
Adjusted R2 = 0.7924.
Jarque-Bera statistic (probability): 0.1026 (0.95).
F-statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey fourth-order test (probability): 0.8229 (0.5152).
F-statistic from the Engle ARCH effect test (probability): 0.9254 (0.3391).
F-statistic from the Ramsey RESET test (probability): 2.4162 (0.1246).
F-statistic from the Wald test (probability): 1.5523 (0.1576).
Unit root tests on long-run residuals (with intercept; see the specifi cations in Table 2):
t-statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (probability): -3.1473 (0.0272).
Adjusted t-statistic from the Phillips-Perron test (probability): -3.1473 (0.0272).
where the long-run solution is:
 SAVING = -0.4125 + 0.145 LNRER – 1.0026 GGDP (10b)
18 A comment on causality, similar to that made with respect to the 
PROFIT equation (see footnote 14), is in order here. Assume the 
saving rate increased exogenously. The current account balance would 
also increase and, if there were a signifi cant effect working through 
this channel, the currency would appreciate. In such case, the real 
exchange rate and the saving rate would be negatively correlated.
19 For a theoretical analysis of this issue, see Blecker (2002).
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where g is the GDP growth rate, i is the investment 
rate (fi xed investment/GDP) and km is the output/capital 
ratio.20
The observations for km were derived as residuals 
from the annual series for the GDP growth rate and 
the investment rate. At this frequency, the series can 
be highly volatile due to fluctuations in aggregate 
demand and, consequently, in the degree of capacity 
utilization. The fl uctuations were eliminated using the 
Hodrick-Prescott trends of the series or their averages 
over long periods.
Figure 10 presents the Hodrick-Prescott trends for 
1960-2007 and shows that there was a decline in the 
GDP/capital ratio throughout the 1960s, 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s. As we might expect, the period 
averages in table 3 reveal the same pattern. The average 
GDP/capital ratio dropped from 0.35 in 1960-1977 to 
0.22 in the early 1990s, and to 0.18 after 1996.21
Because we are focusing on Hodrick-Prescott 
trends and long-run average variations, the decline 
in the GDP/capital ratio must have a technological 
basis. It could also reflect a persistent problem of 
capital underutilization, as suggested by the opinion 
surveys conducted by the Bank of Mexico among 
manufacturing industry executives (López, no date). 
In this case, aggregate demand growth would have 
fallen persistently short of the expectations that fi rms 
entertained when making their investment decisions.
But whether this is a technological phenomenon or 
the result of inadequate aggregate demand, the fact is 
that a fall in the GDP/capital ratio reduces not only the 
GDP growth rate (equation 12) but also the profi t rate 
(equation 11). This reinforces the adverse profi t-share 
effect of the peso’s appreciation on profi tability.
20  There is a limitation in the fact that the profi t rate depends on the 
average GDP/capital ratio, while equation 12 produces an estimate 
of the marginal ratio.
21 Working in a different analytical context, Santaella (1998) and De 
Gregorio and Lee (1999) offer evidence that total factor productivity 
growth in Mexico declined signifi cantly since the 1970s, recording 
negative rates during the 1980s and 1990s. This implies a negative 




 GDP growth  Investment  GDP/capital
 rate rate ratioa
1960-1977 6.23 18.14 0.35
1989-1994 3.91 18.04 0.22
1996-2007 3.58 19.80 0.18
Source: national accounts data from INEGI and World Bank (2005).
a See equation 12 in the text for the calculation of the GDP/capital 
ratio.
FIGURE 10
Mexico: growth identity, 1960-2007, Hodrick-Prescott trends
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At the end of the 1980s, Mexico became the recipient of 
large fl ows of capital and a top exporter of manufactured 
goods, but it failed to sustain high rates of economic 
growth. Analysts of the Mexican economy have offered 
various explanations for this seeming paradox. This 
paper argues that a simple history of relative prices and 
investment profi tability is worth considering.
Since the late 1980s, Mexico’s macroeconomic 
management, and its monetary policy in particular, have 
focused on reducing infl ation. The core of that effort 
lasted more than 15 years, interrupted temporarily by 
the 1995 fi nancial crisis.
As the disinflationary process advanced, the 
peso appreciated in real terms. Currency appreciation 
generally reduces the GDP growth rate directly through 
its impact on net exports, as can be seen in the slowing 
of export growth at the beginning of this decade. But 
currency appreciation can also reduce GDP growth 
indirectly through its impact on the share of profi ts 
in GDP. This paper looks at the indirect channel in 
Mexico’s case, and presents econometric evidence to 
show that the real exchange rate has had signifi cant 
effects on the profi t share of the manufacturing sector 
and on the share of returns on investment 
The profit rate depends both on the share of 
profi ts in GDP and on the GDP/capital ratio. The paper 
shows that the (marginal) GDP/capital ratio in the 
slow-growth period has been well below the levels 
observed in Mexico during the era of rapid growth 
prior to the 1980s. By defi nition, a drop in the GDP/
capital ratio reduces the GDP growth rate, regardless 
of the investment rate, but it also tends to reduce the 
investment rate itself because of its impact on the 
profi t rate.
It is not surprising, then, that the bulk of GDP 
growth should have come from the expansion of exports, 
as can be seen from a simple decomposition of GDP from 
the demand side, while the contribution of investment 
has been insignifi cant. The slow growth of the Mexican 
economy is in part a history of sluggish investment and 





Defi nitions and data sources
Figure 2: the specific import rates were calculated 
as imports of intermediate goods/GDP, imports of 
consumer goods/aggregate consumption, and imports of 
capital goods/fi xed investment. Sources: original trade 
data from Bank of Mexico and national accounts data 
from the National Institute of Statistics, Geography 
and Informatics (INEGI).
GEXP: four-quarter change in real manufacturing 
exports. The original balance of payments data in 
current dollars were deflated by the U.S. producer 
price index. Source: Bank of Mexico and U.S. Bureau 
of Labour Statistics.
LNRER: natural logarithm of the CPI-based real effective 
exchange rate index. Source: original monthly index 
from Bank of Mexico.
GUS: four-quarter change in the U.S. industrial production 
index, seasonally adjusted. Source: original monthly 
index from the United States Federal Reserve.
PROFIT: quarterly average of the profi t share, calculated 
as unity minus the ratio of wages and salaries to 
value added in manufactures. The calculation used the 
average ratio of value added to gross production from 
the INEGI Annual Industrial Survey for the longest 
available period (1994-2003) in order to calculate 
value added from the monthly index. Source: original 
monthly data in current pesos, taken from the INEGI 
Monthly Industrial Survey.
GMPI: four-quarter change in the manufacturing 
production index. Source: original monthly index 
from INEGI.
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GINV: four-quarter change in real gross fi xed investment. 
Source: original data in thousands of 1993 pesos, INEGI.
GGDP: four-quarter change in real gross domestic 
product. Source: original data in thousands of 1993 
pesos, INEGI.
NIR: quarterly average of the annualized 91-day rate on 
Mexican Treasury Certifi cates (CETES), in percentage. 
Source: original monthly data from Bank of Mexico.
INF: four-quarter change in the consumer price index, 
in percentages. Source: original monthly index, Bank 
of Mexico.
SAVING: unity minus the ratio of private consumption, 
net of taxes, to GDP. The calculation includes all public 
sector revenues classifi ed as taxes derived from non-oil 
economic activities, plus gasoline taxes. The variable 
used in equation (10) is the residual of a regression 
of the actual saving rate on a set of quarterly dummy 
variables (adjusted by the estimated intercept). Source: 
original data in thousands of 1993 pesos INEGI.
(Original: English)
Bibliography
Berg, Janine and Lance Taylor (2000): External liberalization, 
economic performance and social policy, CEPA working paper, 
No. 12, New York, New School University, February.
Bergoeing, Raphael and others (2001): A decade lost and found: 
Mexico and Chile in the 1980s, document prepared for 
a conference organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, September.
Blecker, Robert (2002): Distribution, demand and growth in neo-
Kaleckian macro-models, The Economics of Demand-led 
Growth, Mark Setterfield, Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 
Edward Elgar.
 (2007): External shocks, structural change, and economic 
growth in Mexico, 1979-2006, working paper, Washington, D.C., 
Department of Economics, American University, December.
Blyde, Juan S. and Eduardo Fernández-Arias (2004): Why does Latin 
America grow more slowly?, Economic and Social Studies, 
Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank.
De Gregorio, José and Jong-Wha Lee (1999): Economic growth in 
Latin America: sources and prospects, document prepared for 
the Global Development Network, December.
Feenstra, Robert and Hiau Looi Kee (2007): Trade liberalization and 
export variety: a comparison of Mexico and China, The World 
Economy, vol. 30, No. 1, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. 
Galindo, Luis Miguel and Jaime Ros (2008): Alternatives to 
infl ation targeting in Mexico, International Review of Applied 
Economics, vol. 22, No. 2, London, Routledge.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Jason Hwang and Dani Rodrik (2007): What you 
export matters, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 12, No. 1, 
New York, Springer.
Ibarra, Carlos (2008a): Disinfl ation and real currency appreciation in 
Chile and Mexico: the role of monetary policy, Investigación 
Económica, Faculty of Economics, Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, forthcoming.
 (2008b): Exporting without growing: investment, real 
currency appreciation, and export-led growth in Mexico, 
working paper, Puebla, Department of Economics, Universidad 
de las Américas Puebla, June.
 (2003): Sluggish growth, trade liberalization and the 
Mexican disease: a medium-term macroeconomic model with 
an application to Mexico, International Review of Applied 
Economics, vol. 17, No. 3, London, Routledge.
Kalecki, M. (1942): A theory of profi ts, The Economic Journal, 
vol. 52, No. 206/207.
Kamin, Steve and John Rogers (2000): Output and the real exchange 
rate in developing countries: an application to Mexico, Journal of 
Development Economics, vol. 61, No. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier.
Lall, Sanjaya (2000): The technological structure and performance 
of developing countries manufactured exports, QEH working 
paper, No. 44, Oxford, University of Oxford, June.
Lederman, Daniel, Ana María Menéndez and others (2003): 
Mexican investment after the Tequila crisis: basic economics, 
‘confidence’ effects or market imperfections?, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, vol. 22, No. 1, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier.
López, Julio (n/d): Mexico’s economic prospects reconsidered, 
working paper, Mexico City, National Autonomous University 
of Mexico.
López, Julio and Alberto Cruz (2000): ‘Thirlwall´s law’ and beyond: 
the Latin American experience, Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, vol. 22, No. 3, New York, M.E. Sharpe Inc.
Moreno-Brid, Juan Carlos (1999): Mexico’s economic growth and 
the balance of payments constraint: a cointegration analysis, 
International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 13, No. 2, 
London, Routledge.
Moreno-Brid, Juan Carlos, Jesús Santamaría and Juan Carlos Rivas 
(2005a): Industrialization and economic growth in Mexico alter 
NAFTA: the road travelled, Development and Change, vol. 36, 
No. 6, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.
 (2005b): Mexico: economic growth, exports and industrial 
performance after NAFTA, Estudios y Perspectivas series, 
No. 42, LC/L.2479-P, Mexico City, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC 
Subregional Headquarters in Mexico. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.06.II.G.6.
102 C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 5  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 8
MEXICO’S SLOW-GROWTH PARADOX  •  CARLOS IBARRA
Pachecho-López, Penélope (2005): The impact of trade liberalization 
on exports, imports, the balance of payments and growth: 
the case of Mexico, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 
vol. 27, No. 4, New York, M.E. Sharpe Inc.
Ramos, M. and A. Torres (2005): Reducing infl ation through infl ation 
targeting. The Mexican experience, working paper, Mexico 
City, Bank of Mexico, July.
Ros, Jaime and Nora Lustig (2000): Trade and fi nancial liberalization 
with volatile capital infl ows: macroeconomic consequences 
and social impacts in Mexico during the 1990s, CEPA working 
paper, No. 18, New York, New School University, February.
Ros, Jaime, Joost Draisma and others (1996): Prospects for 
growth and the environment in Mexico in the 1990s, World 
Development, vol. 24, No. 2, Amsterdam, Elsevier.
Santaella, Julio (1998): Economic growth in Mexico. Searching 
for clues to its slowdown, document prepared for the Inter-
American Development Bank, December.
Tornell, Aaron, Frank Westermann and Lorenza Martínez (2004), 
NAFTA and Mexico’s less than stellar performance, NBER 
working paper, No. 10289, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, February.
World Bank (2005): World Development Indicators, 2005, 
Washington, D.C., CD-Rom version.
